CISA adds two more DELMIA Apriso flaws to KEV: what to hunt and how to fix fast

Two DELMIA Apriso vulnerabilities-CVE-2025-6205 (missing authorization) and CVE-2025-6204 (code injection)-are now in CISA’s Known Exploi...

CISA confirmed active exploitation of two more DELMIA Apriso vulnerabilities and added them to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on October 28, 2025: CVE-2025-6205 (critical missing authorization) and CVE-2025-6204 (high-severity code injection). Federal agencies have three weeks under BOD 22-01; the remediation due date cited is November 18, 2025. (BleepingComputer). (bleepingcomputer.com)

DELMIA Apriso is a manufacturing operations/MES platform commonly deployed on Windows with IIS and a backend database. Vendor advisories state both CVEs affect releases 2020 through 2025, with the missing authorization bug enabling privileged access and the code injection bug enabling arbitrary code execution under specific conditions. (Dassault Systèmes CVE-2025-6205, CVE-2025-6204; NVD 6205, NVD 6204). (3ds.com)

Here’s why this matters for forensics: Apriso’s web tier runs on IIS, and prior in-the-wild activity against Apriso leveraged SOAP/WCF endpoints in the application (for CVE-2025-5086), giving us concrete URL and payload patterns to hunt. (SANS ISC diary showing Apriso exploit POSTs to /apriso/WebServices/FlexNetOperationsService.svc/Invoke). (isc.sans.edu)

Intrusion Flow

  • Initial access paths we expect:
  • Likely target surface: Apriso IIS web apps and WCF/SOAP services under /Apriso/… (mirroring the previously observed CVE-2025-5086 patterns against FlexNetOperationsService). (SANS ISC example request). (isc.sans.edu)
  • Where CISA stands: additions to KEV mean “active exploitation” (attempted or successful) has been observed, and remediation is required under BOD 22-01 timelines for FCEB agencies. (CISA KEV explainer). (cisa.gov)
  • Context: CISA previously added DELMIA Apriso CVE-2025-5086 in September 2025 after observed exploit attempts. (CISA alert, Sept. 11, 2025, SANS ISC diary). (cisa.gov)

Key Artifacts to Pull

Detection Notes

  • IIS log hunting (KQL-style over normalized logs)
// Look for large SOAP POSTs to Apriso services and anomalous auth patterns
IISLogs
| where cs_uri_stem has "/Apriso/" and cs_method == "POST"
| where cs_uri_stem has "/WebServices/" or cs_uri_stem has "/Portal/" or cs_uri_stem has ".svc"
| extend isLarge = tolong(cs_bytes) > 20000 or tolong(sc_bytes) > 20000
| where isLarge or cs_uri_stem has "FlexNetOperationsService.svc/Invoke"
| summarize count(), any(cs_username), any(c_ip) by bin(datetime, 15m), cs_uri_stem
  • Web-to-process pivot on Windows endpoints (Sysmon Event ID 1)
// w3wp.exe spawning LOLBINs or script interpreters
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "w3wp.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wmic.exe")

Response Guidance

Here’s what we’d pull first

Takeaways

Sources / References