CVE-2025-62215: Windows Kernel LPE zero‑day in November Patch Tuesday — what DFIR should collect and detect

4n6 Beat
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Microsoft’s Nov 11, 2025 updates fix 63 CVEs and an in‑the‑wild Windows Kernel race‑condition LPE (CVE‑2025‑62215). Here’s a succinct IR...

Microsoft’s November 11, 2025 Patch Tuesday addressed 63 vulnerabilities and one actively exploited Windows Kernel local privilege escalation tracked as CVE-2025-62215, a race-condition bug enabling SYSTEM after an attacker wins a concurrency window locally. Microsoft credits MSTIC and MSRC for discovery, and the flaw is rated CVSS 7.0 (important) with active exploitation confirmed. DFIR teams should expect this to be used post-compromise to elevate from a low-priv foothold. Patch fast, and hunt for privilege jumps and follow-on activity. BleepingComputer, The Hacker News, Tenable, NVD.

Intrusion Flow

  • Initial access via phishing, social engineering, or another bug, followed by local code execution under a standard user. Attackers then trigger CVE-2025-62215 to escalate to SYSTEM by winning a race condition in the Windows Kernel. Expect this to be part of post-exploitation chains, not the initial entry. The Hacker News, Tenable.
  • Technically, Microsoft and NVD describe the issue as “concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization,” with related weakness notes also listing double-free (CWE-362/CWE-415), consistent with race-condition exploitation outcomes. NVD.
  • Mappings you’ll see downstream after SYSTEM: service or task creation for persistence (ATT&CK T1543.003), token manipulation to spawn elevated shells (ATT&CK T1134.*), and credential access via LSASS once admin is obtained (ATT&CK T1003). MITRE T1543.003, MITRE T1134.001, Sysmon reference for LSASS access detection primitives.

Key Artifacts to Pull

  • Event logs
    • Security.evtx and System.evtx from C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs (copy off for timeline). These are the primary sources for 4688 (process creation), 4672 (special privileges), 4697 (service install), and 4698/4702 (scheduled task create/update). Microsoft Learn 4688, 4672, 4697, 4698, Event log file path.
    • WMI Activity: Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational and Trace channels for process/service manipulation via WMI. Enable and export if not already logging. Tracing WMI Activity, Logging WMI Activity.
  • Crash dumps (exploitation attempts may cause instability)
  • Execution traces
  • Sysmon (if deployed)
    • ProcessCreate, ImageLoad, and DriverLoad events support correlation around escalation moments. Verify configuration captures command lines and loads. Sysmon.

Detection Notes

  • Priority correlations (Microsoft Defender for Endpoint advanced hunting)
    • Low/Medium integrity process creating or resulting in a SYSTEM or High-integrity process within a short window can indicate escalation.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel in~ ("Low","Medium")
| where ProcessIntegrityLevel in~ ("High","System")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,
         InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, FileName, ProcessIntegrityLevel, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

This uses integrity and token metadata exposed in DeviceProcessEvents. Defender XDR schema: DeviceProcessEvents.

  • Hunt for service and scheduled task creation near suspected escalation:
// New services (via Security 4697 surfaced through EDR sensors as process + registry writes)
union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where tostring(ActionType) has_any ("ServiceInstalled","RegistryValueSet")
| where RegistryKey endswith "\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services" or ActionType == "ServiceInstalled"
| summarize count(), min(Timestamp), max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RegistryKey

Reference Windows Security event 4697 for service install semantics. 4697.

  • Look for token abuse right after escalation (e.g., whoami, net, lsass access) and abnormal 4672 “special privileges” for non-SYSTEM identities:
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("whoami.exe","net.exe","nltest.exe","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","rundll32.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel in~ ("High","System") and ProcessIntegrityLevel in~ ("High","System")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

Use 4672 to spot unexpected privileged logons. 4672. For persistence, monitor 4698/4702 task events. 4698, Audit policy context.

  • Sysmon/WMI instrumentation
    • Ensure Sysmon logs process and driver load events; ensure WMI-Activity Operational/Trace logs are enabled for WMI-based lateral movement or persistence. Sysmon, WMI tracing.
  • Technique mapping for detections and hunts: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (ATT&CK), Windows Service creation (T1543.003), Token impersonation/creation (T1134.*). MITRE T1543.003, MITRE T1134.001.

Response Guidance

  • Patch and confirm
    • Apply November 2025 cumulative updates across Windows clients and servers; this is the only confirmed in-the-wild zero-day this month (CVE-2025-62215). For Windows 11 24H2, the Nov 11 build/KB pairing (e.g., 26100.7092 via KB5068966) is a reference point. Windows 10 entered ESU this month; organizations must upgrade or enroll to keep receiving fixes. BleepingComputer, Windows 11 version history.
    • Expect restarts in standard baseline months; hotpatch programs may reduce reboots depending on platform and enrollment. Validate your update ring’s baseline vs. hotpatch schedule. Microsoft Support (restart/hotpatch schedule).
  • Contain and triage
    • Isolate endpoints showing suspicious integrity jumps or new SYSTEM-context shells and export Security/System/WMI logs and any memory dumps. Use consistent chain-of-custody and export commands (e.g., wevtutil epl) during live triage. Event log file path, Dump locations.
  • Hardening (reduces blast radius of kernel LPE + post-exploit)
    • Enable Memory Integrity (HVCI) / VBS on capable devices to harden kernel exploitation surfaces. HVCI overview, OEM enablement/defaults.
    • Enforce Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist or App Control for Business block rules to limit BYOVD pivots used alongside LPEs. Driver blocklist.
    • Turn on key Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to constrain common post-escalation abuse paths (e.g., block LSASS credential stealing; block PsExec/WMI-originated processes in managed environments). ASR rules reference.
    • Enable LSA Protection (RunAsPPL) on supported devices to raise the bar for LSASS tampering post-SYSTEM. LSA protection.
  • Logging hygiene
    • Right-size and enable operational channels used in escalation/persistence investigations (WMI-Activity, TaskScheduler Operational) and ensure Sysmon coverage with command-line and image-load telemetry. WMI tracing, Sysmon.

Takeaways

Sources / References