Holiday IR Playbook: Web Skimming and Credential‑Stuffing at Retail Scale

Black Friday/Cyber Monday surge puts e‑commerce in the blast radius. Here’s a focused incident‑response plan to pre‑stage logging, hunt f...

Holiday IR Playbook: Web Skimming and Credential-Stuffing at Retail Scale

Retailers see elevated risk during Black Friday and Cyber Monday, with advisories emphasizing exposure management (fix misconfigurations, enforce MFA, patch web apps and infrastructure) and pre-staging detections for web skimming and credential-stuffing to shorten time-to-containment. (cybersecasia.net)

Intrusion Flow

  • Client-side web skimming (Magecart-style)

    • Initial access: exploit public-facing apps/CMS, stolen admin creds, or supply-chain injection to place malicious JavaScript. (trustwave.com)
    • Data capture: injected script hooks payment/checkout DOM, validates card data (e.g., Luhn), and encodes exfil (often Base64). (trustwave.com)
    • Exfiltration: outbound beacons via XHR/WebSocket/IMG requests, sometimes disguised as analytics or image loads. (akamai.com)
    • Server-side variants: malware persists in templates/filesystems or databases; data is staged and periodically exfiltrated to reduce noise. (sansec.io)
  • Credential-stuffing → ATO (account takeover)

    • Prep: stealer logs feed large credential sets; operators pre-stage configs and test infra days before sales. (fortinet.com)
    • Execution: high-volume automated logins using residential proxies/bots; retail/e-commerce bears disproportionate load. (blog.cloudflare.com)
    • Impact: stored cards/loyalty/gift cards monetized; spikes in bot logins around holiday windows. (blog.cloudflare.com)

Key Artifacts to Pull

  • Edge/CDN and load balancer access logs for traffic baselining and anomaly detection:
    • AWS Application Load Balancer (client IP, URI, user_agent, latencies). Enable if not already. (docs.aws.amazon.com)
    • Amazon CloudFront standard logs (c-ip, method, host, uri, status, x-forwarded-for). (docs.aws.amazon.com)
    • Azure Application Gateway/WAF access and firewall logs (clientIP, requestUri, userAgent, status, WAF actions). (learn.microsoft.com)
  • Web server/app logs: origin HTTP access/error, application audit trails, template/theme change logs (CMS), build/deploy logs.
  • Client-side security telemetry: CSP violation reports via Reporting API (report-to/report-only) to surface unexpected script/connect/img destinations. (developer.mozilla.org)
  • Identity/SSO: IdP auth logs (AAL/MFA events), step-up challenges, session issuance/termination per NIST SP 800-63 Rev. 4. (pages.nist.gov)
  • Threat-intel/context: PCI DSS 4.0.1 e-skimming requirements (6.4.3 script inventory/integrity; 11.6.1 payment-page tamper detection). (blog.pcisecuritystandards.org)

Detection Notes

  • Web skimming

    • DOM/network indicators during checkout: new or obfuscated inline scripts; unexpected third-party script loads; outbound beacons to unapproved domains via XHR/WebSocket/IMG constructors. Block/alert with strict CSP: script nonces/hashes and connect-src/img-src allowlists; ingest CSP violation reports. (developer.mozilla.org)
    • Log heuristics: first-seen domains in referer/URI on checkout paths; mismatched SRI/integrity for expected scripts (where used); sudden changes to template files preceding anomalies. (developer.mozilla.org)
    • Content hunting: grep/deobfuscate for atob(), fromCharCode(), split/reverse patterns, Luhn checks, and IMG-based exfil strings in served HTML/JS. (trustwave.com)
  • Credential-stuffing/ATO

    • Edge signals: sustained spikes in POST /login with low success rate, unusual user-agent/IP churn, and bursts preceding sale start; watch API login endpoints as well. (blog.cloudflare.com)
    • Baselines: one-in-five authentication requests being malicious automation is a common pre-mitigation average; expect higher during promotions. (f5.com)
    • Threat timing: configs and test runs often begin 10-14 days pre-event; increase sensitivity earlier than Thanksgiving week. (kasada.io)
    • Control references: OWASP guidance on detecting/mitigating credential-stuffing (MFA, device/IP heuristics, lockout/captcha as defense-in-depth). (cheatsheetseries.owasp.org)
  • Sample queries (adapt to your stack)

    • ALB auth flood (pseudo-SQL over parsed ALB logs)
      SELECT time_bucket('5 minutes', ts) AS t,
             COUNT(*) AS logins,
             SUM(CASE WHEN elb_status IN (401,403) THEN 1 ELSE 0 END) AS fails,
             COUNT(DISTINCT client_ip) AS src_ips,
             COUNT(DISTINCT user_agent) AS uas
      FROM alb_logs
      WHERE request_path IN ('/login','/api/login')
        AND ts >= now() - interval '7 days'
      GROUP BY 1
      HAVING COUNT(*) > baseline(t)*2 AND (fails::float/COUNT(*)) > 0.9;
      
    • CSP violations for unexpected destinations (KQL over Reporting API sink)
      csp_reports
      | where effectiveDirective in ('script-src-elem','connect-src','img-src')
      | summarize dcount(documentURL), makeset(blockedURL) by bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)
      | where array_length(set_blockedURL) > 0
      

Response Guidance

  • Pre-event hardening and triage focus

    • Prioritize patching of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (use CISA KEV as input to your risk model) and verify remediation on internet-facing systems. (cisa.gov)
    • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA for admin and customer accounts where feasible per NIST SP 800-63 Rev. 4; step-up on anomalous logins. (pages.nist.gov)
    • Turn on and ship edge/access logs to centralized search (ALB/CloudFront/Azure App GW/WAF) before peak traffic. (docs.aws.amazon.com)
    • Implement/verify PCI DSS v4.0.1 e-commerce controls: 6.4.3 (script inventory/authorization/integrity) and 11.6.1 (tamper detection on payment pages). (blog.pcisecuritystandards.org)
  • If skimming indicators are present

    • Immediately remove/rollback modified assets; block outbound exfil domains at WAF/edge; deploy strict CSP in enforce mode for checkout with report-to enabled. (akamai.com)
    • Hunt server-side for persistence (templates, cron, DB-stored scripts) and staged data caches; review recent deploys and admin logins. (sansec.io)
    • Engage PCI workflows for potential card data exposure per 6.4.3/11.6.1; preserve evidence and coordinate with PSPs. (blog.pcisecuritystandards.org)
  • If credential-stuffing/ATO is active

    • Throttle and challenge automation (progressive rate limits, bot mitigation at edge, step-up MFA for risky flows); monitor API auth endpoints. (f5.com)
    • Invalidate active sessions for confirmed ATO accounts; rotate tokens/refresh secrets; consider password resets for impacted cohorts. OWASP provides defensive patterns and recovery guidance. (cheatsheetseries.owasp.org)
    • Track adversary timing: increase alerting sensitivity in the 10-14 days leading into sales events. (kasada.io)
  • Cross-cutting considerations

    • Expect elevated ransomware/BEC/social engineering risk during holidays; ensure on-call coverage and rapid comms paths. (cisa.gov)
    • Use incident checklists and containment guidance from CISA to structure actions under pressure. (cisa.gov)

Takeaways

  • Turn on and centralize edge/app logging now; test queries before traffic spikes. (docs.aws.amazon.com)
  • Lock down checkout with strict CSP and reporting; maintain a payment-page script inventory and tamper detection to meet PCI DSS v4.0.1. (developer.mozilla.org)
  • Treat credential-stuffing as a campaign: pre-position bot defenses and step-up MFA for risky auth flows, starting 10-14 days pre-event. (kasada.io)
  • Prioritize KEV-listed patches and verify fixes, especially on internet-facing components. (cisa.gov)

Sources / References